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A note on k-price auctions with complete information
when mixed strategies are allowed
Timothy Mathews and Jesse A. Schwartzy
Kennesaw State University
September 1, 2016

Abstract
Restricting attention to players who use pure strategies, Tauman (2001) proves that
in a k-price auction (k 3) for every Nash equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy: (i) the bidder with the highest value wins the auction and (ii) pays
a price higher than the second-highest value among the players, thereby generating
more revenue for the seller than would occur in a …rst- or second-price auction. We
show that these results do not necessarily hold when mixed strategies are allowed. In
particular, we construct an equilibrium for k
4 in which the second-highest valued
player wins the auction and makes an expected payment strictly less than her value.
This equilibrium–which exists for any generic draw of player valuations–involves only
one player using a nondegenerate mixed strategy, for which the amount of mixing can
be made arbitrarily small.
JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C72 (noncooperative games), D44 (auctions)
Keywords: k-price auction
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Introduction

Tauman (2001) considers k-price auctions, in which a seller of a single unit solicits monetary
bids from n

k players, with the player submitting the highest bid winning the auction and

paying the k-th highest bid (with ties broken randomly). Players have complete information
about each other’s values and are named such that their values are nonincreasing:
v1 > v 2 >

> vn :

As far as we know Tauman’s is the only paper that considers k-price auctions in an complete information setting. The incomplete information setting is studied by Monderer and
Tennenholtz (2000, 2004), Azrieli and Levin (2012), and Tumendemberel (2013). Payo¤s to
players in Tauman’s setting are linear: if player i wins a good with probability q and pays
m, her payo¤ is: qvi

m. Tauman restricts strategy spaces to pure strategies and restricts

attention to Nash equilibria in which players do not use weakly dominated strategies (he
shows that a pure strategy bid b0i is weakly dominated if and only if b0i < vi ). In this setting, Tauman constructs a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy and …nds that for every such equilibrium, the following results hold:
R1:

Player 1 (with the highest value) wins the auction with probability one.

R2:

The seller obtains an expected pro…t

in the interval [v2 ; v1 ].

In our note, we maintain the complete information setting, but allow the players to use mixed
strategies. We construct a Nash equilibrium (in which no player uses a weakly dominated
strategy) for the k-price auction (k

4) in which neither result R1 nor R2 holds. Our

equilibrium exists for all (generic) draws of valuations such that valuations di¤er. Further,
only player k uses a nondegenerate mixed strategy: all other players use a pure strategy.
Further still, such equilibria can be constructed in which player k places an arbitrarily close
to one probability on a single bid. Thus, our note sheds light on the critical nature of the
pure-strategy assumption in Tauman’s note.
1

Before getting underway, we remark that mixed strategies are natural to consider in auction games with complete information. For example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) construct
mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the …rst-price auction and Hillman and Riley (1989) do the
same for the all-pay auction. In the …rst-price auction, the second-highest valued player uses
a mixed strategy which never wins in equilibrium (but is critical for providing the highestvalued player’s equilibrium incentives). In the all-pay auction, both the second-highest and
highest-valued bidders use mixed strategies, with the second-highest valued player winning
with positive probability. More generally, k price auctions have an all-or-nothing aspect,
where all but one player lose the auction and get a payo¤ of 0 while one player wins the
auction and can get a nonzero payo¤, making these auctions not so di¤erent from zero sum
games such as matching pennies where mixed-strategy Nash equilibria obtain. For one example, see Walker and Wooders (2001) who give evidence that tennis players use mixed
strategies in deciding where to serve and defend.
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Results

We construct a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for any k-price auction with k

4. We

…rst parameterize bid strategies and then show that with appropriately chosen parameter
values, the strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. Let H be a potential bid such that
H > v1 . Suppose that the players use the following strategies. All players but player k use a
pure strategy: player 1 bids her value v1 ; player 2 bids H + " (" > 0); players 3 through k

1

each bid H; and each player i > k bids her value vi . Player k uses a mixed strategy: bidding
H with probability p and bidding v3 with probability 1

p, where 0 < p < 1. Observe that

these strategies are weakly undominated (since no player bids below her value).
We next construct the conditions needed to support the equilibrium. Using the proposed
strategies, player 2 will win the auction and will pay v1 with probability p and pay v3 with
probability 1

p; all other players will lose the auction and earn payo¤s of 0.

2

If player 1 unilaterally deviates by bidding high enough to win the auction (say by bidding
H +2"), then the k-th highest price will be set by the realization of player k’s mixed strategy.
Equilibrium requires that player 1’s expected payo¤ from such a deviation be nonpositive:
p (v1

H) + (1

p) (v1

v3 )

(1)

0:

Any deviation by player 1 such that she still loses the auction leaves her payo¤ unchanged.
For the proposed strategies to form an equilibrium, player 2 must earn a nonnegative
payo¤:
p (v2

v1 ) + (1

p) (v2

v3 )

(2)

0.

If condition (2) holds, then there are no pro…table unilateral deviations for player 2: any bid
higher than H leaves her payo¤ unchanged; any bid lower than H gives her payo¤ 0; and
a bid of exactly H ties for highest, and she will sometimes get the payo¤ given in (2) and
sometimes 0, depending on the seller’s random selection of the winner.
If any of the remaining players (i > 2) unilaterally deviates by bidding high enough to
win the auction, the resulting price will be either v1 or v3 , thereby not increasing the player’s
payo¤.
Thus, the conjectured strategies form a Nash equilibrium so long as both conditions (1)
and (2) hold. For any pro…le of player values, both conditions (1) and (2) can be satis…ed
by simultaneously making H large enough and p > 0 small enough.1
These strategies do not form an equilibrium in a third-price auction (k = 3). In this
case, there is no bidder that always bids H. By unilaterally deviating to bidding b0 2 (v1 ; H)
with probability one, player 2 will still win the auction when it is pro…table for her to do so
(when player 3 bids v3 ), but player 2 will lose the auction whenever winning would result in
a loss for her (when player 3 bids H). Thus, player 2’s expected payo¤ from this deviation
strictly increases to (1

p) (v2

v3 ), invalidating the proposed strategies from forming a

Nash equilibrium.
1

Conditions (1) and (2) can respectively be expressed as H

3

(v1

v3 ) =p+v3 and p

(v2

v3 ) =(v1 v3 ).

Summing up, we have found equilibria for the k-price auction (k

4) in which only player

k is using a nondegenerate mixed strategy and, further, her probability 1

p of bidding v3

can be made arbitrarily close to one, if in turn H is su¢ ciently high for condition (1) to
hold. Player 2 (with the second highest value) wins the auction with probability one and
the seller obtains expected revenue of pv1 + (1
equilibria with p < (v2

v3 ) =(v1

p)v3 . This revenue is strictly less than v2 for

v3 ). Consequently, these mixed-strategy Nash equilibria

violate both R1 and R2 that Tauman found to be true of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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